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INTRODUCTION:  
 We are about 50 years from a collapse in the Earth’s water systems. In the past 100 years, 
60% of the world’s wetlands have been destroyed, taking along with them nature’s ability to 
filter pollutants. Deforestation has its consequences too. Certainly tree roots absorb water and 
hold a watershed in place, but when the trees get cut down, the water also loses its home. Even 
though less water is being absorbed because of deforestation, we are pumping up to 15 times 
more water from the ground than is being returned to it. We build dams which restrict the natural 
flow of water, killing off the nutrients necessary for fertile soil.1 Urbanization has increased the 
amount of paved sidewalks and streets, so when it rains, the water no longer penetrates into the 
ground; instead it runs into the drainage system, ending up in lakes and oceans, where 
evaporation increases our cloud coverage, further perpetuating the ground water depletion 
process.  
 Fact: the global population is multiplying at an exponential rate. Problem: the quantity of 
freshwater available is changing at the same rapid pace, but in the opposite direction. According 
to Arun P. Elhance, it is in a time like this, when severe scarcity of a critical, non-substitutable, 
and communal resource like freshwater is experienced or anticipated by one or more states; 
and/or when such a resource is “perceived as being overexploited by other states at a cost to 
one’s own,” that states may become prone to conflict.2  
This thesis will look at shared transboundary river basin resources, specifically those of 
the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins, as a major source of potential conflict between 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – the five republics of Central 
Asia; a region where the collapse of the Soviet Union has ended centrally-driven cooperation and 
                                                          
1 Maude Barlow, Blue Covenant (NY: The New Press, 2007), 6-14. 
2 Arun P. Elhance, Hydro-Politics in the 3rd World (DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 4. 
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heightened the significance of water as a national security issue. The working thesis question is 
simple yet significant: will there be war or cooperation in Central Asia over shared river basin 
resources? While this thesis focuses on the largely unexplored region of Central Asia, this 
question has been asked many times before, producing a polarized debate. 
“An international river is a common property resource shared among the basin states.”3 
According to David LeMarquard, this is the root of the debate on whether shared river basin 
resources will result in war or cooperation; and it provides the foundation for both schools of 
thought. After a comprehensive exploration of the literature, I noticed a major gap: all of the 
literature seems to ignore the interconnectedness of the specific water variable with other socio-
political conflicts, and thus the difficulty (some would say impossibility) of isolating the water 
variable as the main contributor to either war or cooperation. Accordingly, this thesis takes a 
more holistic approach, arguing that it will not be the water allocation variable that will directly 
cause violent conflict or cooperation in Central Asia; instead it will be the overlay of current 
trigger conflicts, specifically the disputes over shared transboundary river basin resources, upon 
historical root causes of conflict that will result in war. 
 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW: 
Freshwater is essential for human life. In the twentieth century as the world's population 
tripled, water consumption rose by 700%. By 2050, with three billion more in population, we 
will consume 80 percent more water. But even today we are facing a freshwater crisis. Global 
warming, pollution and population explosion have already left two billion people in water 
stressed regions; 783 million people – 11% of the world’s population, do not have access to 
                                                          
3 As cited in Peter Rogers, “The Value of Cooperation in Resolving International River Basin Disputes,” 
Natural Resources Forum 17, no. 2 (1993): 118. 
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clean and safe drinking water. By the year 2025, 1.8 billion people – two-thirds of the world’s 
population will face water scarcity and there is no known source for the water that they will 
require to survive.4 Presently, over five million children die each year because of water-borne 
illnesses, making it the leading cause of disease and death around the world. Maude Barlow, 
called the “Al Gore of water,” further illustrates this horrifying statistic: “More children are 
killed by dirty water than by war, malaria, HIV/AIDS and traffic accidents combined.”5  
Clean Water Resources: 
The problem is not that all the water is gone and the Earth is beginning to resemble a 
prune; instead, it is that the planet is running out of clean, uncontaminated water, which is, 
inconveniently, essential to human survival. While man has a tendency to place blame for his 
problems on anyone but himself, it wasn’t Mother Nature or God that spoiled our most basic 
survival need; this problem is entirely man-made. According to the World Water Assessment 
Programme, two million tons of human waste are disposed of in watercourses on a daily basis; 
and in the developing world 70 percent of industrial waste is dumped untreated into waters 
where it pollutes the usable water supply. In India, where washing away one’s sins with river 
water has historically been a part of the Hindu tradition, in recent years an increasing number of 
worshippers have boycotted the ritual, for would a god really shun an otherwise faithful believer 
for refusing to bathe in sewage?  
In 2004, the Sri Lankan bureau of the International Water Management Institute 
uncovered a disturbing fact about where else this sewage can be found. In their survey of hidden 
wastewater irrigation practices they discovered that sewage is also being used to fertilize crops. 
                                                          
4 Maude Barlow, Blue Covenant (NY: The New Press, 2007), 3. 
5 Ibid., 1. 
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In fact, one-tenth of the world’s irrigated crops are watered by sewage, most of it “gushing 
directly from sewer pipes into fields at the fringes of the developing world’s great megacities.”6 
Instead of figuring out long-term solutions for resolving the pollution problem, the world 
is turning to ancient groundwater sources to meet our short-term needs. Using sophisticated 
mining technology capable of drilling deep into the Earth’s oldest aquifers, the water deposits are 
completely extracted, one blue-gold mine at a time. But unfortunately for our children and 
grandchildren, we are taking without replenishing. Instead of using this water for basic living 
needs and subsistence farming, practices that will allow it to make its way back through the 
hydrologic cycle, we are using it to make plastic bottles, oil and computers.  
In the developed world, the culprit of this unsustainable practice is big agribusiness firms; 
whereas in the developing world, the water is being over-extracted by millions of small farmers 
using their own personal pumps. While scientists are unsure of when groundwater supplies will 
be fully depleted in certain regions because of the unregulated nature of the whole practice, they 
do know that, today, groundwater should be considered a finite resource and will soon be gone. 
With that in mind, it is worth noting that in 2007 the National Groundwater Association 
determined that 43.8% of the American population depended on groundwater for its daily 
drinking water supply. 
High-Technology Solutions: 
If this solution of using groundwater for our daily needs is only temporary, then we need 
to find another answer before we run out of clean, potable water. Many of the world’s leading 
nations and most prominent institutions believe that the way to alleviate the pressure from this 
                                                          
6 As cited in Maude Barlow, Blue Covenant (NY: The New Press, 2007), 10. 
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monumental crisis is with high-technology solutions like dams, diversions and desalination. 
While there are major benefits of all three, each one has the potential to cause even greater harm.  
Apart from the Great Wall of China, dams are the most mammoth structures ever built. 
For more than 5,000 years now dams have prevented flooding, provided water storage enabling 
large cities to be built in desert regions, produced enormous amounts of hydropower for 
developing economies, and helped to irrigate farmland. Recent research suggests that smaller 
dams yield more benefits; the larger the structure, the larger the environmental and social 
consequences. This is because big dams tend to trap organic materials, which create methane gas 
– a major source of greenhouse gas emissions7. According to the International Rivers Network, 
they are also the reason why some of the world’s largest rivers no longer reach the ocean, why 
deltas have been destroyed, why one-third of the world’s freshwater species are extinct or 
endangered.  And while downstream riparian populations may benefit from the flood protection a 
dam provides, or from the enhanced irrigation, they are usually uprooted when the dams are 
constructed, never experiencing any of these benefits; instead being more adversely impacted 
than anything else.8  
Another answer to the freshwater crisis, tried without success by many, is to take 
freshwater from where it exists in nature and divert it through pipelines to where it is most 
needed. It seems we should already be proficient at assembling these vast networks of pipelines, 
since we use them to move titanic amounts of oil and gas on an hourly basis; however, we are 
moving our precious water resources thousands of miles with no real planning or understanding 
of the ecological ramifications of these actions. After years of testing the effectiveness of this 
                                                          
7 Maude Barlow, Blue Covenant (NY: The New Press, 2007), 22. 
8 Richter, B.D. et. al., “Lost in Development’s Shadow: The Downstream Human Consequences of Dams,” 
Water Alternatives 3, no. 2 (2010): 15. 
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option, the results are starting to come in: desertification (i.e. further exacerbation of the water 
crisis), disruption of wildlife and ecosystems, domestic conflicts between rural communities and 
large urban centers, and international conflicts when countries lay claim to the same 
groundwater.  
The Aral Sea is one of the most shocking examples of a diversion failure. Located in the 
northwest of Uzbekistan and southwest of Kazakhstan, the Aral Sea was once the fourth largest 
lake in the world. The sea supported a major fishing industry in the 1950s and was a 
transportation hub for the cities of Aral’sk in the north and Muynoq in the south.  In the 1960s 
Soviet leaders decided it was necessary to divert water from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers 
to provide water for the newly created cotton industry of Uzbekistan.9 Over the next few 
decades, the consequences of their decision became difficult to ignore. Due to the loss of water 
inflow to the Sea, by the end of 1996 the Sea’s total area had decreased by 57 percent, though the 
salt level had increased to oceanic levels, causing all the freshwater fish to die.10 By 2007 it had 
declined to 10% of its original size and split into four different lakes. By 2009 one of the four 
had disappeared altogether. Because Uzbek soil was never good for growing cotton crops, 
enormous amounts of pesticides were used in the region, with the runoff inevitably 
contaminating the groundwater and the river water. During the first three years of the Soviet 
cotton project, the national average for diseases such as typhoid fever, viral hepatitis, 
tuberculosis and throat cancer were three times higher than normal. And due to poor water 
                                                          
9 Maude Barlow, Blue Covenant (NY: The New Press, 2007), 26. 
10 “Aral Sea Reborn,” Al Jazeera, last modified July 21, 2012, 
www.aljazeera.com/programmes/earthrise/2012/07/201271912543306106.html. 
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quality in the region even today, anemia, cancer and tuberculosis continue to be pervasive 
issues.11 
The third and ostensibly most viable solution to all our water-woes is desalination. 
Desalination is the “process whereby salt is removed from seawater or brackish water either by 
evaporation or by forcing the salty water through tiny membrane filters in order to create fresh, 
drinkable water.”12 Considering 97.5% of the world’s water is saltwater, desalination would 
provide an easy answer for our water problems.  
Unfortunately, water desalination involves monumental costs, and very few water-
stressed countries can afford to use this technology. In wealthy nations like Israel, Singapore, 
Australia and the United States, politicians continue to look to this as an option. But as it has 
become a more popular topic of discussion amongst the world’s leaders, scientists have taken a 
closer examination of this technology and its environmental and human health hazards. The 
findings show that large desalination plants are highly energy-intensive and would increase 
greenhouse gas emissions exponentially, exacerbating the water crisis they were built to 
alleviate.  
Also, the combination of the concentrated brine with the chemicals and heavy metals 
used in the desalination process produces a poisonous by-product. According to Australian 
environmental writer John Archer, one plant could pump more than thirty-six billion liters of 
                                                          
11 Phillip Whish-Wilson, “The Aral Sea Environmental Health Crisis,” Journal of Rural and Remote 
Environmental Health 1, no. 2 (2002): 30. 
12 Maude Barlow, Blue Covenant (NY: The New Press, 2007), 26. 
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poisonous waste back into the sea every year. This black brine can be seen “fanning out into the 
ocean” in aerial photos of the big Saudi Arabian desalination plants.13 
The USGS Water Science School has a rather brazen view on the desalination topic, 
evidenced by the question they pose on their website: how ‘bout a cool, refreshing cup of 
seawater?’ But perhaps their question is not blunt enough. Try inserting the words “biologically 
contaminated with viruses and bacteria,” before the word “seawater.” Now insert this phrase: 
“chemically contaminated with endocrine disrupters and pharmaceutical products.” While both 
sentences sound ludicrous, the facts are not. The desalination technology only filters out salt. But 
the contaminants listed above are in waters everywhere.  And when we remember that the 
developing world dumps 70 percent of its industrial waste into its water supply, “it is not hard to 
imagine the quality of water that would be processed by desalination plants for human 
consumption.”14 Though the Pacific Institute’s Peter Gleick is not opposed to desalination plants, 
he admits that they pose a threat to the environment and will only speed up climate change and 
increase the fresh water shortage we are already experiencing today.15  
The fact that none of these high-tech solutions seems to provide the answer to the global 
fresh water crisis, in conjunction with the unprecedented level of demand for the fresh water 
resources we do have available, has forced the international community to consider the 
likelihood of  international wars being fought over these scarce resources. While this thesis looks 
specifically at the transboundary river basin resources of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins as 
a major source of conflict between the five Republics of Central Asia, the literature, within 
                                                          
13 Maude Barlow, Blue Covenant (NY: The New Press, 2007), 27. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 28. 
9 
 
which a polarized debate has emerged, speaks to fresh water resources in general, as either a 
source of conflict, or a source of cooperation. 
Water Wars – The Literature: 
Several scholars, like Cooley, Starr, Remans, Bullock and Darwish point to fresh water not 
only as a cause for conflict, but as “the resource which will bring combatants to the battlefield in 
the 21st century.”16 Because there is no substitute for fresh water, the world’s 263 international 
watercourses, which cover almost half of the earth’s surface, are home to around 40% of the 
world’s population, and generate about 60% of global freshwater flow,17 have and will continue 
to become the source of numerous international and national conflicts.  
 There are a number of other reasons in the literature besides the unprecedented levels of 
demand, for the theory that disputes over transboundary river basin resources are more likely to 
result in war than cooperation. One is that rivers ignore any and all political boundaries. The 
International Peace Research Institute of Oslo, an institution whose research has made significant 
progress recently in establishing a direct correlation between scarcity and conflict, says that the 
probability of military conflict increases when “rivers cross borders rather than form borders, as 
this creates upstream/downstream dynamics.”18 When one country’s access to river basin 
resources can be affected by another’s actions, the people involved may begin to see the problem 
as a zero sum situation. Typically, it is the downstream nation that loses. This is because the 
upstream country can affect the volume or the quality of the downstream nation’s water by 
diverting it or polluting it, but the downstream riparian is not able to do the same. This is 
                                                          
16 Aaron T. Wolf, “Conflict and Cooperation along International Waterways,” Water Policy 1, no. 2 (1998): 
252. 
17 Meredith A. Giordano and Aaron T. Wolf, “Atlas of International Freshwater Agreements,” Oregon State 
University, publication by UNEP compiled by Oregon State University, 2002, 
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/atlas/atlas_pdf/1_Front_atlas.pdf. 
18 Havard Hegre et al.,“Shared Rivers and Interstate Conflict,” Political Geography 19 (2000): 971. 
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currently going on in the Middle East between Syria and Turkey. According to Maude Barlow, 
the two nations came to the brink of war in 1998 over water resources, and today Syria is 
accusing Turkey of deliberately meddling with its water supply. What may result in these 
situations, as Peter Rogers suggests, is that the downstream nation will begin to present the 
upstream nation as an antagonist. By creating an enemy, the emotions of the general public 
intensify and they begin to group the main issue of water, with other historical grievances, like 
ethnic divisions. Examples of this situation can be seen throughout the Middle East and also 
between India and Pakistan, South Africa and Lesotho and Egypt and Ethiopia.19  
 The fact that shared waterways more often than not, have multiple and conflicting demands 
on their use becomes a stronger indicator of a violent outbreak. As an example of this, Peter 
Rogers refers to the unresolved dispute between Bangladesh and India, dating back to 1975 
concerning the Indian Farakka Barrage on the Ganges River, which diverts water away from 
Bangladesh. The Brahmaputra River, shared by China and India, also has caused tension 
between the two in recent years when China drafted its own diversion plans. As I briefly 
mentioned earlier, war almost erupted between Turkey and Syria in 1998 because Turkey 
decided to build dams on the Euphrates River. In 2012, Uzbekistan President, Islam Karimov, 
warned neighboring nations Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, that their efforts to build hydroelectric 
power stations on the headwaters of the shared Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya Rivers could cause a 
war between them. His reason for saying this was because the dams would disrupt water supplies 
to downstream states, “adversely impacting the economy and damaging the environment.”20 The 
leaders of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan argue that they need to harness hydropower in order to 
                                                          
19 Peter Rogers, “The Value of Cooperation in Resolving International River Basin Disputes,” Natural 
Resources Forum 17, no. 2 (1993): 117. 
20 Joanna Lillis, “Uzbekistan Leader Warns of Water Wars in Central Asia,” EurasiaNet, September 7, 
2012, www.eurasianet.org/node/65877. 
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boost their weak economies. Karimov would therefore agree with Wolf that multiple and 
conflicting demands on the use of water resources can lead to war. Karimov said that important 
international organizations like the United Nations only discuss the issue of countries sharing 
limited international water resources because they believe that it could become an escalatory 
problem that causes relations to deteriorate, and if aggravated enough, “can spark not simply 
serious confrontation but even wars.”21 
 What gives the previous argument more gravity is the fact that international law does not 
govern water disputes (like the disagreement between the Central Asian nations) effectively; and 
in addition, international law provides no enforcement mechanism to prevent water conflicts 
from occurring. The 1997 Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, “a flexible and overarching global legal framework,” adopted by the United 
Nations, provided hope for nations in dispute over water resources. The Convention establishes 
“basic standards and rules for cooperation between watercourse states on the use, management, 
and protection of water resources that cross international boundaries.”22 The General Assembly 
had the support of more than one hundred nations when it adopted the document on May 21, 
1997, however, in 2008, only 16 states had ratified the agreement. The agreement required 
ratification by 19 more states in order to come into force. Thus, no universal agreement has been 
put into effect governing international water resources. Some individual nations, like Pakistan 
and India, have implemented their own treaties that govern interstate cooperation on their 
specific basin; however these agreements often lack sufficient legal protection. Where 
agreements do exist, 80% are only between two countries, even where other states are a part of 
                                                          
21 Joanna Lillis, “Uzbekistan Leader Warns of Water Wars in Central Asia,” EurasiaNet, September 7, 
2012, www.eurasianet.org/node/65877. 
22 Flavia Loures, Alistair Rieu-Clarke, and Marie-Laure Vercambre, “Everything you Need to Know about 
the UN Watercourses Convention,” WWF, January 2009, 
http://assets.panda.org/downloads/wwf_un_watercourses_brochure.pdf. 
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the watercourse in question. Another problem with current treaties is that many fail to take into 
account how climate change will have long-term effects on water availability; and for that 
reason, there is a need to revisit water allocations on a regular basis. However, what is worse is 
that for most basins, no agreements are in place at all.23 For that reason, even though the 1997 
Convention was never legally implemented, it does provide a general framework for nations to 
reference when they find themselves caught in international water disputes.  
 However, even this last hope for those seeking guidelines may cause more harm than good. 
Aaron T. Wolf says the 1997 Convention “reflects the difficulty of marrying legal and 
hydrologic intricacies”24 and so therefore, instead of preventing disputes over water resources, it 
may actually perpetuate them. Wolf’s opinion is supported by those of Beach, Hammer, Hewitt, 
Kaufman, Kurki, and Oppenheimer, all of whom say that the document institutionalizes the 
inherent upstream/downstream conflict by calling for not either/or, but both ‘equitable use’ by 
parties, and an ‘obligation not to cause appreciable harm.’ The problem is that these two 
principles are in conflict with one another. ‘Equitable use,’ which gives the needs of the present 
the same weight as those of the past, favors the upstream riparian – the nation where the 
waterway originates. This principle expresses respect for a riparian’s sovereign right to control 
resources found on its own territory, but restricts its uses to ensure reasonable shares for the 
other riparians. However, the upstream nation effectively gets to define “reasonable,” as there is 
no enforcement mechanism to ensure that they obey the rules. Therefore and especially when the 
stakes are high (e.g. national survival), the downstream nation is not ensured an equitable share.  
                                                          
23 Flavia Loures, Alistair Rieu-Clarke, and Marie-Laure Vercambre, “Everything you Need to Know about 
the UN Watercourses Convention,” WWF, January 2009, 
http://assets.panda.org/downloads/wwf_un_watercourses_brochure.pdf. 
24 Aaron T. Wolf, “Conflict and Cooperation along International Waterways,” Water Policy 1, no. 2 (1998): 
252. 
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 The other principle – ‘obligation not to cause appreciable harm,’ which protects the 
preexisting uses and historic rights, considers the nation that has been using the waterway the 
longest – typically the downstream country. Throughout history, downstream riparians, such as 
Egypt and Iraq, often receive less rainfall than their upstream neighbors and therefore have 
depended on the river water for a much longer period of time.25 They therefore use this principle 
to deny new uses to co-riparians on the grounds that they will affect existing uses. According to 
the Convention, all parties involved in transboundary water disputes have a responsibility to 
protect the watercourses and to work together to manage them in a sustainable and integrated 
manner; however without legal mechanisms in place to force their cooperation and acquiescence, 
also coupled with the reality that the demands and threats to the scarce resources are at an 
unprecedented high, it is increasingly difficult for states to willingly cooperate and share the little 
that is left.  David Phillips says that when riparians feel “constrained in their ability” to realize 
“their national goals and objectives,”26 generally because one or more co-riparian is unilaterally 
using the resource, conflict is likely to emerge. 
 The final reason for why water wars are more likely than water cooperation over shared 
transboundary river basin resources is because of the ever increasing trend of ‘Water 
Securitization’ throughout water-scarce regions of the world. When water is perceived as 
essential for national survival and for the continued economic growth of the country, it often 
becomes ‘securitized.’ In contrast to materialist approaches of classical security studies that 
focus on the material dispositions of a security threat including distribution of power, military 
capabilities and polarity, securitization theory, developed by the Copenhagen School, examines 
                                                          
25 Aaron T. Wolf, “Middle East Water Conflicts and Directions for Conflict Resolution,” (Discussion Paper 
12, International Food Policy Research Institute, 1996), 17. 
26 Marwa Daoudy et al., Trans-Boundary Water Cooperation as a Tool for Conflict Prevention and for 
Broader Benefit-Sharing (Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006), 19.  
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how a certain issue is transformed by an actor into a matter of security. Securitization of an issue 
enables the use of extraordinary means (i.e. violence) in the name of security.27 Water has 
become securitized because international law treats water as property – according to Joachim 
Blatter and Helen Ingram, “a thing that territorially defined political units can appropriate and 
own.”28 Even though water has long been commodified (and therefore some have it while others 
don’t), every human being, and every nation needs it for survival. As a result, in places like 
Israel and Turkey, researchers and scholars struggle to get access to important water data 
because the governments consider that information sensitive and confidential. Central Asian 
states have also tended to securitize water for a number of reasons. Not only do the five major 
republics need to provide 65 million people with 20-50 liters of water a day to ensure their basic 
needs are met, but according to Beatrice Mosello, they are also motivated by “national concerns 
over economic development, the need to control ethnic tensions and social uprisings, and the 
need to manage environmental degradation and population growth.”29 She goes on to say that 
securitization, in turn, “has dissipated the prospect of a hydro-political complex in the region, 
thus wasting the ‘cooperation-inducing’ potential of water resources.”30 Often times, as in the 
case of Central Asia, the downstream riparians have more power, economically and/or militarily 
than the upstream, resource-rich nation. Therefore, when the upstream riparians ‘capture’ the 
water resources before they reach the downstream countries the downstream countries may use 
what leverage (i.e. force) they have available to them. This water securitization transforms what 
                                                          
27 Angela Kachuyevski and Ronnie Olesker, “Social Boundaries and Societal Security: A Framework for 
Analysis,” (Unpublished Manuscript, 2012). 
28 Joachim Blatter and Helen Ingram, Reflections on Water: New Approaches to Transboundary Conflicts 
and Cooperation (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 35. 
29 Beatrice Mosello, “Water in Central Asia: Prospect of Conflict or Cooperation?” (Working Master’s 
Thesis, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, 2008), 151. 
30 Ibid., 153. 
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could be a cooperative, non-zero sum situation into a zero-sum hydropolitical conflict. 
Securitization of water-related issues would hence appear to increase the risk of conflict.  
Water Cooperation – The Literature: 
 Those on the other side of the argument deny any causality between water scarcity and 
international war. There are four main arguments that support the assertion that disputes over 
shared transboundary river basin resources will more likely result in cooperation than violence. 
The first is the historic argument. According to Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Michael Brecher, 
creators of the International Crisis Behavior dataset – a systematic collection of international 
conflict – no war has ever been fought over water.31 While many of us immediately think of past 
conflicts over the Jordan River, or the more recent conflict in Darfur; or maybe even recalling 
1924 and 1927 when Owens Valley residents blew up parts of the Los Angeles aqueduct after 
seeing all the water meant to supply their farms get pumped into the steadily growing San 
Fernando Valley, as prime examples of water wars, Peter Gleick says that the study of historic 
conflicts over water shows how water was used and manipulated as an instrument of war, but not 
necessarily as the main cause for engaging in actual warfare for the control of natural 
resources.32 This claim that water is just an instrument and not the main catalyst, along with the 
strict parameters Wilkenfeld and Brecher use to define “international dispute,” provides an 
explanation for why this historic argument can be made at all, even though there are many past 
conflicts that would seem to prove the contrary. Even though no interstate war has ever been 
fought over water according to this criterion, there is sufficient evidence that shared freshwater 
resources have caused considerable international instability, and even acute violence.  
                                                          
31 Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, “International Crisis Behavior Datasets: Version 9,” 
University of Maryland – International Crisis Behavior Project, 2009.  
32 As cited in Heather L. Beach et al., Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Resolution (NY: United Nation 
University Press, 2000), 16. 
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 The second argument is that shared interests outweigh water’s conflict-inducing 
characteristics. Arun P. Elhance says that unilateralism and water do not mix – that although 
sovereign states are inherently inclined to exploit their water resources unilaterally, in the end, 
even the strongest riparian states who share water basins are bound to pursue some form of 
cooperation with their weaker neighbors.33 His justification for this statement is that “the 
inescapable interdependencies among riparian states” coupled with “the costs of noncooperation 
make cooperation inevitable.”34 State sovereignty, a principle that has historically obstructed 
hydropolitical cooperation, is being challenged by the growing interdependence in the global 
economy.35 States are now becoming more in favor of regional economic cooperation, so as to 
expedite the flow of goods, services, ideas and information across their permeable borders. 
Because of the criticality of water for economic life, the pursuit for cooperation is being 
extended into the arena of transboundary river basins. Neighboring states might cooperate on a 
megaproject, such as a dam, because there are rewards for both parties. Floods and droughts can 
wreak havoc on a country. By constructing a dam on the headwaters of a shared river, the stored 
floodwater can be released downstream during droughts. Also, many countries, like Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan, suffer from severe shortages of electricity for household, industrial and 
agricultural needs. A dam or hydroelectric power station can provide a substantial portion of 
those needs, as well as regulate the flow of water downstream, benefiting the downstream 
riparian’s agriculture.36 The increasing interconnectedness of our international system has 
created an environment that is more conducive to collaboration than to war. Thus under normal 
                                                          
33 Arun P. Elhance, Hydro-Politics in the 3rd World (DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), ix. 
34 Ibid., x-xi.  
35 Ibid., 244. 
36 Aaron T. Wolf, “Conflict and Cooperation along International Waterways,” Water Policy 1, no. 2 (1998): 
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conditions, but especially when states are facing water scarcity, the literature points to 
cooperation as the only rational solution.  
 Wolf says that, while only “seven minor skirmishes”37 have been fought over international 
waters, over 3,600 international water treaties have been signed. To him and many other ‘Water 
Peace’ scholars, that fact alone would substantiate the argument that cooperation is more likely 
than war. Furthermore, they say that when actors do create cooperative water treaties they are 
durable and effective. Two examples provided in the literature of institutional resiliency are the 
Mekong Committee, which has functioned since 1957 exchanging data through the Vietnam 
War; and the Indus River Commission which survived two wars between India and Pakistan.38 
While water treaties have been criticized in the past for neglecting important issues that, if left 
unaddressed, could trigger violent conflict, a review of fifty recent (past decade) bilateral and 
multilateral water agreements suggest some improvements. For example, while many treaties in 
the past focused solely on the quantity of water being shared between actors, recent treaties 
address water quality management in international rivers. Also, in the past, most water treaties 
were bilateral even though river basins are often shared by more than two actors. Although full 
basin participation is still rare, a growing proportion of treaties are multilateral, thus including 
more of the affected states, and sometimes even referencing the rights and interests of non-
signatory states.39 These improvements would suggest that cooperative water treaties will 
continue to be durable in the future, aiding in the prevention of violent conflict. 
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 The next argument for why cooperation is more probable than war over shared river basin 
resources is that economically, war does not make sense. Scholars and politicians say that water 
is not costly, but war is. Israel is one of the few riparian states that actually has the military 
capabilities and economic resources to engage in a full-scale war. It can be used here as an 
example of how hydropolitical aggression inflicts substantial costs and losses. Israel is a 
militarily strong lower riparian state that, as Julie Trottier and Paul Slack argue, occupied the 
territory of its upper riparian neighbor in order to control the transboundary water resources. But 
even Israel has realized that in addition to the cost in human lives, the economic and political 
costs of such an occupation only continued to increase with time, eliminating any chance that 
this plan would be a cost-effective or long-term solution for Israel’s water problems.40 Most 
other countries facing water scarcity are in a more economically and politically precarious 
situation that Israel and so going to war to exact resources is not a feasible option. 
 The final argument for why water peace will prevail over water war is a strategic one. Even 
the notorious ‘Water War’ scholar, Thomas Homer-Dixon, who seems to have found a link 
between environmental stress and violent conflict, implies that water wars are just not going to 
occur everywhere. In Homer-Dixon’s words, the “most probable,” and to Water Peace scholars, 
the “only feasible,” situation for an attack would be if the downstream nation is not only highly 
dependent on river water, but is also the regional hegemon.41 The reason for this being that the 
upstream nation would have no cause to launch an attack, for it has control of the water, and it 
would be imprudent for the weaker state to do so. According to these criteria, finding a site for a 
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water war is difficult, therefore providing the argument for why water peace is the more likely 
outcome. 
Gaps in the Literature: 
  While the literature provides a comprehensive investigation into water’s conflict-
inducing and cooperation-inducing characteristics, it seems to ignore the fact that water conflicts 
are often interconnected with an array of other socio-political conflicts, making it difficult to 
isolate the water allocation variable as the main contributor to violent conflict and/or 
cooperation. Therefore, because water issues historically intersect with deep-rooted issues such 
as identity or border disputes, all of the literature saying that transboundary river basin resources 
alone will either cause cooperation or war seems overly simplified and limited.   
 The literature also fails to incorporate theory on the outbreak of violent conflict. The water 
wars literature does not seem to require a historical trend of conflict between actors for the 
outbreak of a war. Instead it seems an immediate conflict trigger, like construction of a mega-
dam of the headwaters of a shared river, has the potential to spark a war between otherwise 
harmonious actors. However, the theory of violent conflict says that while the potential for 
conflict exists wherever opposing interests, values or needs clash,42 a dispute over a common and 
non-inflammatory issue like water-sharing or oil prices, is not likely to turn violent unless there 
is also a long-term rivalry between the parties over fundamental issues like religion or other 
value-based beliefs; the reason being that these causes often evolve into threats to individual or 
collective identity.43 And because they are the needs or values that the parties regard as vital to 
their core identity and survival, they are not only more immune to resolution and/or elimination, 
but they justify using violence as a defense mechanism. In these situations, an initially trivial 
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trigger conflict may become an escalatory “turning point,” where the “issues begin to broaden, 
and victimized groups begin to link the triggering incident to more fundamental grievances.”44 
 The literature says that a repetitive cycle, in which there are periods of intense conflict 
activity followed by periods of dormancy, will commence and progress until eventually, a 
violent war will result.45 When an immediate conflict is resolved peaceably, but the root causes 
of conflict continue to exist, a new trigger conflict will inevitably arise in the previous one’s 
place; the underlying, root issues unchanged and ever-present. So though it is absent from the 
Water War/Water Cooperation literature, it is imperative to note that, according to the violent 
conflict literature, war erupts when a trigger conflict, like allocation of shared resources, is 
rooted in historical grievance and there is an inclination for conflict between the actors.  
 While there is no question about whether water is in dispute in Central Asia, there is no 
cookie cutter solution since there appear to be many other immediate and underlying disputes at 
play as well. Therefore, in order to avoid a war in Central Asia, whether it is a water war, an 
ethnic war, or a war fought over territory, third parties must determine and address all causes of 
conflict, instead of just the water dispute.   
 
METHODOLOGY: 
 The purpose of this research is to predict if current disputes over shared river basin 
resources in Central Asia will result in war. Two main theories have emerged from the literature: 
the first is that shared transboundary river basin resources will ultimately lead to war; and the 
second is that shared transboundary river basin resources will ultimately lead to cooperation. My 
hypothesis is that it will not be the specific water allocation variable alone that will cause war or 
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cooperation; instead it will be the overlay of conflict triggers upon historical root causes of 
conflict that will result in war. This hypothesis relies on the theoretical proposition of violent 
conflict that trigger incidents rooted in fundamental grievances often become escalatory turning 
points in a conflict, and thus in these situations war is more likely than cooperation.46  
 
Case Study Selection:  
 The reason I chose Central Asia as my case study is because its geopolitics make it the 
perfect site for a water war, based not only on Homer-Dixon’s criteria, but also on the criteria of 
skeptical ‘Water Peace’ scholars who say that finding a site for a water war is problematic. 
Despite their differences, Water Scholars agree that conflict over shared river basin resources is 
most likely when a downstream riparian is highly dependent on river water and is strong in 
comparison to upstream neighbors. The Central Asian geopolitical situation in sum is as follows: 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are upstream riparians and therefore in control of the Syr Darya and 
Amu Darya rivers; they have more than adequate access to water resources, and they are poorer 
and weaker than their downstream neighbors. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are the 
downstream riparians who lack water resources, rely heavily on the two rivers for their 
agricultural economies, and are militarily and economically stronger than their upstream 
neighbors. There is also a history of rivalry rather than cooperation between the leaders of the 
five republics.  
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Figure 2: Map of Central Asia 
 
  
23 
 
Variables: 
 Informed by the ‘Violent Conflict’ literature, the independent variables have been 
separated into ‘Root Causes of Conflict’ and conflict ‘Triggers.’ The distinction between the two 
is important in understanding “both the sources and the dynamics of a conflict, as well as for 
coordinating the efforts of management and resolution.”47 Triggers need immediate attention and 
resolution in order to prevent a violent conflict from occurring. However, root causes of conflict 
must also be addressed and removed if there is to be hope for durable peace. So long as a root 
conflict remains, the potential for violence lingers as new triggers will continue to replace the 
ones that have been resolved. 
 Throughout this paper a ‘Root Conflict’ is defined as “the structural or underlying causes 
of conflict between actors,” typically the one common denominator in all conflicts between the 
parties (e.g. ethnic or religious identity). A conflict ‘Trigger’ is defined as “proximate events or 
factors that cause a pre-existing conflict between actors to escalate” (e.g. resource distribution, 
state sovereignty, self-determination etc.).  
 From the ‘Shared Transboundary River Basin Resources’ literature, the dependent 
variable is the ‘Level of Conflict.’ As this thesis aims to predict the likelihood of war or 
cooperation, I have created an analytical spectrum to allow me to identify more precisely the 
gradients between the two extremes of ‘Effective Cooperation’ and ‘Active War.’ For the 
purpose of this paper, ‘Active War’ will be defined using the International Criminal Court’s 
definition of ‘Crime of Aggression’ in Article 8bis of the Rome Statute. Thus, ‘Active War’ is 
here forth defined as, “The use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
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integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations.” To make clear, the difference between a violent ‘conflict’ and a 
‘war’ is determined by the casualty threshold: “as soon as the number of annual battle-related 
deaths reaches the threshold of 1,000 the conflict is defined as ‘war’.”48 In this case study I will 
measure this dependent variable on the following, which, regardless of a formal declaration of 
war, shall qualify as acts of war: 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military 
occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force 
of the territory of another State or part thereof; 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any 
weapons by a State against the territory of another State; 
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State; 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another 
State; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of 
the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their 
presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement; 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be 
used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State; 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out 
acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its 
substantial involvement therein.49 
 
For the purpose of this paper I will use the following definition of ‘Effective 
Cooperation’ provided by Robert Keohane, author of After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord 
in the World Political Economy (1984): “Cooperation is when actors adjust their behavior to the 
actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination.”50 Keohane 
further elucidates on this definition by contrasting ‘Cooperation’ against the state of ‘Harmony,’ 
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which he says is often mistaken as the former. Harmony refers to a situation in which “actors’ 
policies (pursued in their own self-interest without regard for others) automatically facilitate the 
attainment of others’ goals.”51 Conversely, cooperation requires a negotiation process to bring 
the originally non-harmonious actions and views of actors into conformity. Negotiation is a key 
component of the policy coordination process that cooperation, by definition, requires. But in 
order to operationalize ‘cooperation’ to its full capacity, policy coordination must also be 
clarified further.  Keohane uses the definition provided by Charles E. Lindblom to expand on this 
term: “A set of decisions is coordinated if adjustments have been made in them, such that the 
adverse consequences of any one decision for other decisions are to a degree and in some 
frequency avoided, reduced, or counterbalanced or overweighed.”52 Besides cooperation being 
the result of a lengthy negotiation or bargaining process, it can also be imposed. According to 
Helen Milner, “the stronger party in a relationship can force the other side to alter its policies. If 
the stronger party also adjusts its own policies and attempts to realize mutual gains, cooperation 
has occurred.”53  The most perfect consequence (and for this paper, measurement) of 
international cooperation would be a formalized treaty; however there is often a period before an 
agreement has been formalized of lengthy negotiation or bargaining, and relationship-building. 
This phase is important in the cooperation process and will still be measured as cooperative 
behavior seeing as cooperation requires not explicit agreement, but only the expectations of the 
actors to converge.54  
In the middle of the spectrum there is a ‘Null’ state where neither effective cooperation, 
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nor active war is occurring. Between this null state and the state of cooperation exists one other 
condition, called ‘Ineffective Cooperation.’ Here communication and cooperation between the 
parties is limited, however there is an overall sense of order and stability.  Value and goal 
differences exist between the parties, making effective cooperation difficult, but disputes are 
generally resolved in a nonviolent, diplomatic way.55 Between the null state and the state of 
active war exists the condition of ‘Intractable Conflict,’ characterized by tension and suspicion 
amongst the leaders, inflammatory rhetoric depicting neighboring states as the enemy, and 
isolated incidents of small-scale violence. 
Conflict Analysis Methodology: 
 Since the literature on violent conflict requires the presence of both root causes and conflict 
triggers for a violent outbreak to occur, I will conduct a partial conflict analysis to determine 
what triggers and root causes of conflict exist in Central Asia. My thesis would support the 
theory that if one or the other is absent from the current conflicts in this region (i.e. there are 
immediate trigger conflicts but no root causes that link all past and current conflicts together) 
then cooperation is more likely than war. However, if I can ascertain that both classifications of 
conflict are present, I expect that war will be the result.  
 A conflict analysis is usually conducted before third party intervention or mediation in a 
conflict. The aim is to gain a comprehensive understanding of potential or ongoing violent 
conflicts by analyzing key conflict factors at the local, national, regional and international 
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levels.56 According to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), a conflict analysis should 
answer questions of strategy. The USIP analysis framework is broken into four parts; each with 
its own questions of strategy. Part one is to understand what the conflict(s) is about; part two is 
to understand the actors to the conflict; part three is to understand the broader context of the 
conflict (i.e. what type of institutions are already in place to manage conflict, etc.); and part four 
is to understand the actors’ power and sources of leverage. As this type of assessment is 
generally expansive, it requires balance: Its breadth must be limited so as to avoid overwhelming 
the assessor with superfluous information; but it must also avoid being perfunctory by only 
providing standard observations and conclusions. 57 The conflict analysis methodology has been 
proven by the UN, the World Bank, NGOs and Western nations, all who have used their findings 
to create durable conflict prevention or conflict management policies, and peace building 
interventions. 
 Before Central Asia requires third party intervention, it is important to first establish 
whether or not the conflicts there are likely to escalate into war, and whether intervention and 
mediation are necessary. Therefore, this thesis will only apply part one of the USIP framework to 
the case study. However I have broken it into the following three activity categories according to 
their different purposes: (1) To understand the current conflict triggers, (2) To understand the 
historical grievances and their effect on the current conflict triggers, (3) To understand and 
consider the case study from the alternative theoretical perspective (i.e. Cooperation). Each will 
have questions of strategy that have been designed to incorporate the variables under 
examination. While subsection three does not come directly from the USIP framework, it was 
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included so the case study analysis would adhere to principles established by prominent Case 
Study research scholar Alexander George.  
 There are three phases in George’s design and implementation of theory-oriented case 
studies. This study dutifully follows phase one: the formulation of objectives, and the design and 
structure of the research. Phase two implements the proposed design, which in this study is the 
USIP framework. This framework utilizes standard procedures, ensuring that the assessor asks 
the same set of questions, and adheres to the same logic and structure in each case. The 
framework’s structural objectivity will aid in eliminating any bias the assessor might have 
towards the case studies or findings.  In the second part of this phase, George tells us to consider 
alternatives. The USIP framework allows the assessor to consider whether the hypothesized 
explanation is more consistent with the facts than alternative explanations. In phase three of 
George’s case study research, the researcher considers any possible theoretical or policy 
implications of the study’s findings.58 While the primary goal of conducting a conflict analysis is 
to gain a comprehensive understanding of a potential or ongoing violent conflict, the hope is that 
its findings would prompt immediate and decisive change that would prevent a conflict from 
either occurring or escalating. This thesis will address any implications from the findings in the 
conclusion. 
 
Analytic Framework: 
 In accordance with the conflict analysis method being employed in this research, I 
articulate a set of questions for each part of the abridged USIP framework to apply to the case of 
Central Asia.  
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1) Understand the Current Conflict Triggers 
• Analyze Triggers of Conflict 
i. What are the key issues in contest?  
ii. What are the sources of these issues?  
iii. Who are the primary actors to the conflicts?  
• Identify commonalities among the different issues 
i. What factors are common to each conflict? 
• Identify and Address Characteristics of Intractability 
i. What is the severity level of the issues in dispute? 
ii. What factors make these conflicts hard to resolve? 59 
2) Understand the Historical Grievances and their Effect on Current Conflicts 
• Identify Historical Causes of Conflict 
i. What are the identifiable and salient historical grievances among the 
actors?  
• Consider how past disputes have been settled 
i. Did third parties play a significant role?  
ii. Did their resolution efforts have lasting success? 
• Consider the significance of historical grievances on current conflict triggers 
i. Are current conflicts related to historical conflicts?  
ii. Do the historical grievances contribute to intractability of current conflict 
triggers? 
3) Consider the Case Study from the Alternative Theoretical Perspective (i.e. Water 
Cooperation) 
• Historic argument against war 
i. Is history a useful predictor in zero-sum water conflicts today? 
• Institutional resiliency argument against war 
i. Have water-treaties and agreements proven effective and durable in this 
case?  
• Strategic argument against war  
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i. Are there insurmountable impediments to cooperation in this case? 
• Economic argument against war 
i. Are the main actors rationally driven by economic calculus? 
• Geopolitical argument against war 
i. Are the geopolitical facts consistent with the theory that there is no 
feasible site for a water war?  
 
Data Compilation: 
 I will use aggregate data, both qualitative and quantitative to conduct the conflict analysis 
and answer my research question. Census data will provide information about entire populations. 
This data is typically reliable and can illuminate historical trends. I can use this type of 
information to find educational levels, family incomes, and conditions of households to create 
generalizations about regional populations.  
 I will also use organizational statistics that come from various levels of government, 
businesses, and organized groups like labor unions. While I do acknowledge that there can be 
qualitative problems with this kind of data, I will use it to better understand the makeup of a 
particular society. For example, reputable institutions like the IMF, World Bank, the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Economic Outlook 
Database, or the UN (more specifically, the UN Development Program, or the UN Conference 
on Trade and Development), will allow me to draw conclusions based on developmental 
indicators in the region.  
 I expect to find, after using sources like the Corruption Percentage Index and Press 
Freedom Index that democratic principles like freedom of speech and assembly are squelched 
and corruption is ubiquitous in Central Asia, and so it is likely that certain subjects (e.g. foreign 
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aid appropriation) will yield no data. In these instances, I may use as data the opinion of experts 
in the region. I recognize that with this type of data there often comes bias.  
 I will gather more information about the specific water dispute between the different 
regional actors in Central Asia by analyzing the water generation, consumption and allocation 
figures, as well as the Central Asian population density figures. Using the former figures 
alongside the Central Asian population density figures will allow me to see how dire the water 
scarcity issue is in the region. Looking at employment rates within the different country’s 
agricultural sectors will also be important because they will reflect what kind of impact a 
reduction in water allocation might have on the workforce.  
 
Data Organization: 
 Case study evidence can be more difficult to analyze than statistical evidence because, as 
Case Study research scholar Robert K. Yin phrases it, “there are few…cookbook recipes to guide 
the novice.”60 Lin says that instead, this type of research requires “rigorous thinking,” “sufficient 
presentation of evidence” and “careful consideration of alternative interpretations.”61 Lin 
suggests two different analytic approaches for case study researchers. While his idea to make 
case study data conducive to statistical analysis is not relevant for this study, his second approach 
provides practical techniques to give the case study evidence some order prior to analysis. For 
example, he suggests making a matrix of categories in which to place the evidence. Since 
conflict analysis, by nature, is wide-ranging, using at least one organizational tool will be useful 
in presenting the evidence in a coherent and systematized manner. 
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 The primary analytical tool I will use to organize the findings from my study is ‘Yes/No 
Matrices.’ Yes/No Matrices organize different categories of information according to existence. 
In this case study, a matrix will be employed to organize the presence and/or absence of the 
independent variables in the five republics. For instance, a Megaproject, like a dam or 
hydroelectric station, is an example of a current trigger between the five major actors in Central 
Asia, as its construction is often planned unilaterally, without any regard for others in the region. 
Therefore a simple matrix will show which countries are currently in dispute over megaprojects. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Part 1 – Understanding the Current Conflict Triggers:  
The main conflict triggers now and in the past 22 years among the five Central Asian 
republics have been the shared water resources of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. During 
the Soviet era, leaders in Moscow decided to introduce cotton farming to the downstream 
riparian republics of Central Asia. However, as the desert regions of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan 
and Kazakhstan were naturally unfavorable for cultivating cotton, the Soviets had to first 
implement complex water irrigation and distribution systems to transform the dry wasteland into 
arable grounds. During this period all water resources were centrally-managed from Moscow. In 
order to provide abundant resources for the downstream agricultural economies, Moscow used 
dams and canals to control the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, located in the mountainous 
regions of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. After the dams were built, the people living in the water-
rich republics of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan wanted to use the stored water to generate electricity. 
As they lacked access to oil and gas, they were unable to heat their homes during the winter 
months. Though Moscow decided to store the water until summer when it would be better 
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utilized for crop irrigation in the downstream regions, it did fashion an agreement that addressed 
the electricity needs of the upstream riparians.  The arrangement became that the downstream 
countries, which required more water for their agricultural needs, would in return provide 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan with gas and coal in the winter.  
Because of the imposed prioritization for the downstream, cotton-producing, profit-
making regions, Moscow’s projects not only created an upstream/downstream division between 
the five eventually-independent states, but the projects also caused both the cotton-producing 
states to become exceptionally dependent on water for all economic activities, and the upstream 
nations to become highly dependent on the downstream nations for electricity.  
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the previously centralized water and energy 
sharing agreements among the Soviet republics either broke down or were neglected. Without 
the knowledge of how to appropriately manage and care for the water resources, the water 
quality in the region began to deteriorate rapidly and agricultural yields stagnated or fell, taking 
along with them the economies that they were so expertly tied to. The five newly independent 
republics began openly competing for the region’s water resources. 
Since 1991, interstate violence has remained at fairly low levels between the five 
republics and they have successfully avoided an outright interstate war; however in 2013, it is 
undeniable that there are two distinct sources of regional conflict: the Amu Darya River and the 
Syr Darya River; both have the potential to ignite an international war.  
Conflicts Triggers in the Amu Darya River Basin: 
The Amu Darya flows west through Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
and Afghanistan. While it is shared by four of the five Central Asian republics, the two greatest 
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conflicts over the river resources exist between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan.  
The two main issues in contest between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are water quotas 
and wasteful water practices. As the Soviets forced anomalous agricultural economies on 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the economic survival of each country is forever at the mercy of 
adequate supplies of water. However, because of a 1992 agreement signed by all five Central 
Asian republics, both states are also subject to water quotas that limit the amount of water 
resources they can extract. The Almaty Agreement was signed in February 1992 after it became 
apparent that some sort of water-sharing agreement between the five newly independent states 
was necessary. The agreement essentially reinstated the Soviet era water quotas so, as before, the 
downstream countries were given the largest allotments because of their agricultural needs and 
large populations.  
Figure 1: Table showing water allocations under the 1992 Almaty Agreement
62 
Country Syr Darya allocation, % Amu Darya allocation, % 
Kazakhstan 38.1 0 
Kyrgyzstan 1.0 0.4 
Tajikistan 9.2 13.6 
Turkmenistan 0 43.0 
Uzbekistan 51.7 43.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
 
Despite the large allocations given to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in comparison to their 
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upstream neighbors, both states frequently take more than their allotment, seeing as there are no 
reliable measurement technologies or enforcement mechanisms that can ensure compliance with 
the allocation amounts. Due to neglect and ill-maintenance over the years, Turkmenistan’s 
Soviet-era water infrastructure has become inefficient, wasting much of the precious commodity 
it was designed to hold. As fixing the pipes and canals would require an enormous amount of 
money, the state prefers to acquire what it loses in its hydrologic infrastructure by drawing from 
the Amu Darya; in effect, exceeding its quotas. This stolen water is then routed back through the 
faulty system, where it too becomes lost and wasted.  
If Turkmenistan were only wasting its share, perhaps Uzbekistan would not have such a 
grievance. Instead, these wasteful water practices caused an outbreak of violence between the 
two in 1992 when both attempted to redirect the drainage waters of the Tyuyamuyun reservoir, 
located in the delta of the Amu Darya, by cutting pipes and damaging irrigation canals. 
According to Eric Sievers, a Harvard-affiliated attorney who helped manage and direct a number 
of development projects in Central Asia throughout the 1990s, rumors have even circulated about 
a “small-scale secret war” that took place between the two states over the shared water 
resources.63 The reports mention Uzbek troops using force to take control of water installations 
on the Turkmenistan side of the river; and even go so far as to reference a massacre that took 
place in Turkmenistan in 2001, in which large numbers of Uzbek troops were slaughtered.64  
While conflicts over quotas and wasteful practices already exist between Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan, a potentially disastrous conflict between the two lurks on the horizon. In 2000 
Turkmenistan announced its plan to build a miniature Great Salt Lake in the Kara Kum (‘Black 
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Sand’) desert by consolidating drainage resources from the country’s irrigated cotton fields. 
Turkmenistan’s goal: “to grow an additional 500 thousand tons of cotton, 300 thousand tons of 
grain and several thousand tons of fruit annually.”65 Analysts ask a question that suggests 
impending conflict: will the drainage resources alone be enough to fill the vast lake, or will 
Turkmenistan eventually siphon water from the Amu Darya to support the lake? They fear the 
latter, which they say would likely start a war with Uzbekistan.66  
At the opening ceremony for the “Golden Age Lake” in July 2009, Turkmen President 
Gurbanguli Berdymukhamedov said to the state-run newspaper, "We have brought new life to 
these once-lifeless sands. I am convinced that our great deeds will be recalled with glory.”67 It 
seems unlikely that this project, one of the biggest and most ambitious in the world and costing 
upwards of $20 billion dollars,68 will be recalled with glory, seeing as it not only has the 
potential to cause serious conflict with Uzbekistan, but also because for years now, 
environmentalists have been forecasting its doomed fate as the next “Dead Sea.” They say that 
the water pumped into the desert is likely to be contaminated with toxic pesticides and fertilizers, 
and most of it will evaporate anyways. Yet Berdymukhamedov continues to move forward with 
this “logic-defying feat that might have appealed to Stalin,”69 perhaps because it is a logic-
defying feat that might have appealed to Stalin.  
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The second conflict over the Amu Darya is between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Though 
Tajikistan was only given a relatively small quota of the Amu Darya in the Almaty Agreement 
(13.6%), the country has vast needs: first and foremost, for ensuring the survival of its populace. 
As the poorest of the Central Asian republics, Tajikistan must expand its agricultural output in 
order to feed its growing population, and generate enough electricity during the winter months to 
keep its people warm. Inconveniently, both require water. The options available to Tajikistan are 
either to exceed the Almaty allocation amounts by drawing more from the two rivers, or to divert 
water from the Zeravhsan River basin. Considering that 95 percent of the Zeravhsan River 
resources are used by Uzbekistan, increasing the Amu Darya quota was the easier and less 
dangerous option, especially considering Tajikistan’s geographic advantage as the upstream 
riparian. Tajikistan came up with a plan to increase its quota that would not only fix the 
country’s immediate needs, but would also have long-term returns for its ailing economy.  
In May 2008 President Emomali Rakhmon announced that Tajikistan would resume 
construction on the Rogun dam. The dam was one of many started by the Soviets during the 
1970s and left unfinished.70  Rogun could provide Tajikistan with “a sustainable source of cheap 
energy,”71 which the country is in desperate need of. Caused in part by Uzbek blockades, an 
estimated 70 percent of the Tajik population has experienced extended blackout periods during 
past winters, resulting in loses of approximately 3 percent of GDP, according to a World Bank  
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study released in November of 2012.72 Tajikistan’s “intermittent energy supplies”73 have also 
made it difficult to develop domestic industries; a major reason why the country remains the 
poorest in the region. Rogun would not only allow Tajikistan to become energy self-sufficient, 
but it would also enable the country to “develop a robust private sector.”74  
In spite of Rogun’s ability to resolve Tajikistan’s most critical problems, the mega-
project is not being championed by Tajikistan’s neighbors. Uzbek President Islam Karimov 
opposes the project because Rogun will alter the established power balance in the region, giving 
Tajikistan “unfair control over water resources.”75 In his open criticism of the project he 
strategically fails to mention how it would also obstruct Uzbekistan’s efforts to continue 
controlling Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan using fossil fuel as leverage. Instead, Karimov said that 
any project like Rogun or Kambarata-1, another mega-dam in Kyrgyzstan, required the 
downstream riparians’ approval before construction. Perhaps that message fell on deaf ears, 
because on September 7, 2012 Karimov upped his rhetoric, saying projects like Rogun and 
Kambarata I could lead to “not just serious confrontation, but even wars.”76 Though Kazakh 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev supports the arguments of his more antagonistic counterpart 
President Karimov, his statement to the leaders of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan exhibited more 
restraint: “To our neighbors and brothers who are ‘sitting’ on the upper reaches of these rivers, 
we send another ‘fraternal signal’ that we –Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on the Amu-Darya and 
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Turkmenistan, located downstream – most of all perceive the shortage of water; each person 
feels it, because this is their life; this is the life of millions of people.”77 This is not the first time 
that the leaders in the Kazakh capital of Astana have hoped for joint resolution of the regional 
water disputes, even calling for a regional Water and Energy Consortium back in 2006.78  But 
judging from their failed efforts to establish any framework for concrete cooperative action, the 
chances of regional collaboration on Rogun and Kambarata-1 are slim.79  
Fortunately for its opponents, Tajikistan cannot build Rogun on its own considering that 
the $2.2 billion cost is almost half of the country’s GDP. However, Uzbekistan’s disapproval in 
juxtaposition with President Rakhmon’s stubbornness and megalomaniac behavior has left 
potential investors dubious. Russian President Vladimir Putin originally promised to provide $2 
billion, but upon disagreement with Rakhmon over the dam’s height (335 meters, making it the 
tallest dam in the world), Putin withdrew his offer.80 Iran and China have also expressed interest, 
but the collaboration would only be beneficial for them if they could buy the hydropower 
produced at Rogun. Both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are looking into ways to circumvent the 
Uzbek capital of Tashkent where the current electrical grid in the region is centered, and run 
transmission lines north into Kazakhstan, Russia and China; and south into Iran, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.81 Currently, construction at Rogun is on hold while a series of World Bank-funded 
studies are conducted into the dam’s “potential ecological, environmental and socio-political 
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impact on the region.”82 To quote an Economist article titled, “Water Wars in Central Asia: 
Dammed if they Do” –  “if only President Rakhmon could settle for something less than the 
biggest, he would have a better chance of building his dam, and leading his people out of 
darkness too.”83 
Conflict Triggers in the Syr Darya River Basin: 
The Syr Darya River originates in the mountains of Kyrgyzstan and flows northwest 
through the Ferghana Valley of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan where it eventually 
drains into what remains of the Aral Sea. There are numerous conflicts that exist among the four 
republics, all essentially stemming from divergent utilization goals for the shared river resources. 
Until 1990, the main function of the Syr Darya was to provide water for the irrigation 
economies of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.  In 1974 the Soviets commissioned the Toktogul 
reservoir in Kyrgyzstan to help manage the significant change in river flow patterns that had 
caused widespread flooding. The water was to be stored until summer when it could be released 
for downstream irrigation needs. In return for the release of a disproportionate amount of water, 
Kyrgyzstan received coal and oil from the downstream republics to heat its homes during the 
winter months. However, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union Kyrgyzstan decided to 
become self-sufficient by converting the Toktogul reservoir into a hydroelectric power station, as 
it could no longer rely on its downstream neighbors to provide it with fossil fuels.84 
The plant transfiguration has catalyzed a severe upstream-downstream conflict between the 
riparians. The problem that has resulted is that in order to supply hydropower in the winter when 
                                                          
82 Alexander Botting, “Rogun Dam: The Waiting Game,” Diplomatic Courier, last modified March 6, 
2013, www.diplomaticourier.com/news/topics/energy/1376. 
83 “Water Wars in Central Asia: Dammed if they Do,” www.economist.com/node/21563764. 
84 Thomas Bernauer and Tobias Siegfried, “Climate Change and International Water Conflict in Central 
Asia,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1 (2012): 231. 
41 
 
demand is at its highest, Kyrgyzstan must store the water from spring to fall. However, the 
downstream agricultural countries of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan need the water released during 
their growing season i.e. exactly the same months that the Kyrgs want to store it.85 Therefore the 
Uzbek and Kazakh people are relying almost exclusively on water resources that are controlled 
by a state with completely different utilization goals for that resource.  
In the fall of 2008, amidst Kyrgyzstan’s growing anxiety over critically low levels of stored 
water in Toktogul, all four Syr Darya basin states agreed that they would try to come up with a 
regional solution to their water problems. The negotiations stalled when Uzbekistan refused to 
show up. Elicited by historical grievances over border delimitations, the downstream riparian had 
conditioned its involvement on the prerequisite that the Syr Darya River be recognized 
unanimously as a transboundary river basin; Kyrgyzstan refused to make the acknowledgment.86 
Prerequisite aside, a deal was finally brokered when Kyrgyzstan agreed to release the water 
stored at Toktogul during the summer growing season in exchange for a payment as well as gas 
and electricity. Yet, as early as February 2009, Kyrgyzstan was already experiencing extended 
periods of blackouts and electricity shortages, motivating it to seek out alternative, unilateral 
options.87  
Kyrgyzstan has now revived two Soviet hydropower projects, originally proposed while there 
was a centrally-managed water and energy sharing system in place, that could end the country’s 
power shortages and provide “desperately needed export earnings.”88 The Kambaratinsk Dams, 
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more commonly known as Kambarata-1, the larger and more expensive of the two, and 
Kambarata-2, will be able to generate enough electricity for Kyrgyzstan to become self-reliant.  
The alternative and more economical option to Kambarata 1 and 2 was for Kyrgyzstan to 
develop a lower cost thermal power plant to meet its winter energy needs; however this option 
would have increased its dependence on Uzbek natural gas, which the Kyrgs know from 
experience has a tendency to fluctuate significantly in price at the caprice of President Islam 
Karimov, or worse, is often not delivered, particularly in the winter months when they need it 
most.89 So while Kambarata-1 and Kambarata-2 require significant domestic capital and foreign 
investment, Kyrgyzstan chose to plot its own course in the stormy Central Asian seas. The first 
of Kambarata-2’s three units opened in August 2010 with help from Russia. On September 20, 
2012, President Putin offered to also assist with the costs of Kambarata-1. His conditions: a 15-
year extension on Russian military installations on Kyrgyzstan soil. As the current agreement is 
set to expire in 2017, this deal will allow Russia to maintain influence in Central Asia until at 
least 2032.90  
Valentin Bogatyrev, coordinator at a Bishtek think-tank believes that Moscow’s controlling 
stake will make the construction of Kambarata-1 “dependent on the dynamics of the Russian-
Uzbekistan relationship, not the Russia-Kyrgyzstan relationship.” This belief is supported by 
those who see the project as a way for Moscow to coerce the Uzbek capital of Tashkent after the 
country pulled out of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization during the 
summer of 2012.91 Uzbekistan fiercely opposes Kambarata-1 and Kambarata-2 because of 
Kyrgyzstan’s ability to unilaterally manage the water resources. However, as Erica Marat points 
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out in the 2008 Central Asian Caucasus-Institute Analyst Report, it would be in Uzbekistan’s 
best interests to let Kyrgyzstan build “hydro-energy infrastructure” because then water can be 
released for irrigation even during droughts and other periods when the water tables are low.92  
It is important to note that the most severe international allocation disputes in the Syr Darya 
basin involve Uzbekistan as a primary actor, because the downstream state is much more 
sensitive to changes in water availability than the other downstream riparians.93  
Like Uzbekistan, ensuring access to Syr Darya resources for the country’s summer irrigation 
needs is of high importance to Kazakhstan. However, there are a few distinctions between the 
two countries that are important to note. First, a much smaller percentage of Kazakhstan’s GDP 
is generated in the agricultural sector than in Uzbekistan’s (6% in Kazakhstan compared to 22% 
in Uzbekistan). Second, a smaller percentage of Kazakhstan’s population works in the 
agricultural sector than in Uzbekistan (20% in Kazakhstan compared to 44% in Uzbekistan).94 
Third, unlike Uzbekistan, “where the rural population is expected to increase by 60% from 1991-
2020, Kazakhstan faces no population pressure in the agricultural sector.”95 These three 
distinctions, in conjunction with the fact that Uzbekistan has already assumed the antagonistic 
role to challenge Kyrgyzstan’s unilateral actions, have made it possible for Kazakhstan to 
bandwagon with Uzbekistan on the mega-projects issue, while focusing its attention on a more 
pressing water challenge: maintaining its river quality targets. Currently the lower reaches of the 
Syr Darya are highly contaminated with “dissolved solids, pesticides and herbicides,” 96  
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predominantly from Uzbekistan’s irrigation drainage return flows. Meeting these water quality 
targets is important for Kazakhstan because a large proportion of its populace uses the river 
water for household purposes.97 According to a 2004 UNDP survey, in the Pavlodar oblast 43% 
of settlements used water that did not meet national standards; half of the 840 villages in the 
Almaty region did not have access to safe drinking water; and in 42 settlements within the Ili 
River and Lake Balkhash regions, water had to be brought in on trucks so that the villagers 
would not have to drink contaminated water.98  
According to an unclassified cable from the U.S. Embassy in Astana, in order to combat the 
critical state of its drinking water Kazakhstan has introduced a variety of different programs and 
infrastructure rehabilitation projects aimed at creating a “sustainable supply of healthy drinking 
water.”99 But despite its unrelenting efforts major obstacles remain. The country lacks “qualified 
and experienced water experts to implement the reforms” and programs; and because of the lack 
of regional commitment to resolving the water quality problems, Kazakhstan is finding difficulty 
in getting ahead of the problem.  Since more than 50% of Kazakhstan’s water resources originate 
outside of the country’s borders in countries with irrigation-dependent economies; in conjunction 
with the fact that the five states have failed to create a “viable multilateral approach to replace 
the Soviet system of water management,”100 the Kazakh water supply is deteriorating rapidly. 
While it has not yet become an interstate conflict, per se, Kazakhstan’s water quality 
crisis is worth mentioning for two reasons. First, it has the potential to become a conflict trigger 
between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the future if Uzbekistan does not introduce water quality 
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reforms; and second, it shows how the Central Asia water conflicts are multifaceted and should 
not simply be characterized as upstream/downstream conflicts, as they often are.  
 
Commonalities among the Different Conflict Triggers: 
 While there are myriad immediate conflict triggers between the five Central Asian 
Republics over the Syr Darya River and the Amu Darya River, there appear to be two 
commonalities among the different conflicts. The triggers with the most escalatory potential are 
about the seasonality of water release. When the region’s water resources were centrally 
managed by Moscow, the upstream riparian republics of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan released the 
water stored in their dams to the downstream riparian republics of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan during the summer months for their irrigation needs. In return, the downstream states 
provided coal and oil to the upstream republics in the winter to supplement their energy needs. 
However, when the Soviet Union dissolved, each of the five newly independent republics chose 
to pursue a unilateralist approach, controlling instead of trading, its respective resources. While it 
would be mutually beneficial to trade resources like they did during the Soviet era, the riparians 
choose not to cooperate and are instead left in conflict over when to release the water. For their 
needs, the upstream riparians must store the water resources during the spring, summer and fall 
months in order to release it in the winter to generate hydroelectricity. The downstream countries 
conversely need the water released during the summer months for crop irrigation.   
While the seasonality of water release seems to be a common factor among the different 
trigger conflicts over water, it appears that the commonalities among the different conflicts can 
be deduced further. The most basic common denominator of these conflict triggers seems to be 
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the intrinsic economic value of water to the region. Interestingly, this is also the principal factor 
of intractability embedded within each of these conflict triggers.  
 
Factors of Intractability: 
Since all of the Central Asian countries rely heavily on irrigated agriculture and/or 
hydropower, water is perceived as being both essential for national survival and for the 
continued economic growth of the country. Because of the potentially catastrophic combination 
of climate change, pollution and a lack of resource management, and population growth, the 
intrinsic economic value of water in Central Asia has soared, causing it to become a matter of 
national security. Consequently, any and all water-related disputes tend to be highly intractable 
in nature. 
Climate change has already begun threatening the most valuable and conflict-prone 
resource in Central Asia. Due to a reduction in the quantity of the region’s water resources, the 
downstream agricultural countries are experiencing falling crop yields, and as a result, suffering 
economies. In 2010, a series of extreme heat waves and droughts (now explicitly linked to 
climate change by two different studies), had dire consequences on agricultural production, 
especially in Kazakhstan and Russia.101 While Russia is not a part of this case study, it is 
important to mention because according to the Center for Climate and Security, this “long-term 
climatic warming trend”102 that caused the fatal hot weather, could cause Russia to place more of 
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its own demands for water and food on Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; two countries that are 
already experiencing their own shortages, without the additional pressure from Russia. Another 
consequential result of climate change is glacier melt. Currently large quantities of fresh water 
are stored in the glaciers of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and represent a strategic resource for all 
the countries of the region; like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, whose cotton industries are 
dependent on glaciers in the Tian Shan Mountains that feed the Syr Darya River.103 The problem, 
according to a background report commissioned by the UNDP for the 2007/2008 Human 
Development Report, is that 46 of Central Asia’s glaciers are shrinking at the average rate of one 
percent per year.104 Glacier reduction, in conjunction with the rising number of droughts and heat 
waves in the region, has commenced a continual reduction in water flow of the Amu Darya and 
Syr Darya Rivers, further exacerbating the water scarcity problem in the region. Some model 
predictions show the availability of water in the Syr Darya basin decreasing by up to 30 percent 
and up to 40 percent in the Amu Darya basin. While other models show less severe declines, all 
models illuminate a demand for water that exceeds the available supply.105   
While climate change is having a serious impact on the quantity of water available in the 
region, pollution and the lack of regional water management are having equally detrimental 
impacts on the quality of water available. Since the Soviets introduced irrigation-economies to 
Central Asia, the water quality has become heavily polluted from nitrogen and phosphorus 
fertilizers and pesticides, making it largely unacceptable for drinking and household purposes. 
Increased salinity levels in the water and soil, the result of inefficient drainage systems, have 
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negatively impacted agricultural production as well.106 These high salinity and pollution levels 
can be attributed to the significant decline in water quality monitoring across Central Asia since 
1991. In 2009, for the first time since independence, the five CA states came together as part of a 
UNDA project to “define a platform for cooperation on water quality management.”107 They 
have since made significant progress by forming a Regional Working Group, which has 
developed a diagnostic study and guidelines for water quality monitoring, approved by 
institutions in all five of the Central Asian countries.108  
Rampant population growth in Central Asia has added additional pressure on the region’s 
limited water resources, contributing, subsequently, to the intractability of the interstate water 
conflicts. From 1960 to 2012, the population in the Aral Sea Basin has more than doubled to 
over 64 million.109 An estimated 22 million people depend on the irrigated agriculture in 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan for survival. Water is also important for energy 
production: in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, hydropower covers more than 90 percent of the total 
electricity needs, and is also a growing source of export revenue.110 In a region where population 
growth and water availability are inversely related, water has become securitized. Therefore, the 
states perceive any conflicts over water as zero-sum situations, in which there are winners and 
losers. Consequences of water scarcity (similar but not specific to the contemporary theory of 
water-securitization) were first noted by Thomas Malthus in 1798. Malthus said that increased 
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competition over resources would result in famine or war. In regards to water conflicts today, 
Neo-Malthusians stress that it is not the specific water scarcity variable that results in conflict; 
instead it is the “socio-economic consequences of water scarcity”111 (e.g. decreasing agricultural 
productivity or overall economic decline), that will result in conflict. The Neo-Malthusian 
paradigm supports the hypothesis that it is the intrinsic economic value of water to the region of 
Central Asia that makes each trigger conflict there highly intractable.  
 
 
Part 2 – Understanding the Historical Grievances and their Effect on the Trigger Conflicts: 
The interstate trigger conflicts over water are not only intractable in nature, but also have 
escalatory potential because they are fundamentally rooted in substantial historical grievances. 
These have arisen out of arbitrarily imposed, repeatedly redrawn, and casually enforced 
boundaries, and have been aggravated by the establishment of enclaves. In turn, the boundary 
and enclave disputes have taken on attributes on ethnic conflict.  
The origins of grievance and conflict can be traced back to the period immediately 
following the Bolshevik Revolution, when Stalin and the Soviets decided to “liberate this region 
from the old imperial structure”112 by delimiting internal borders. This decision has in effect, 
created pervasive and protracted difficulties for the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia. 
Informed by the literature on Violent Conflict, I predict that as long as this root cause of conflict 
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exists, existential trigger conflicts will continue to arise in Central Asia, each one with escalatory 
potential, until eventually a violent war erupts.113   
Before making the final decision to divide Central Asia into republics, there was a debate 
among Stalin and his Soviet planners about whether or not individual republics were the best 
way to organize the region. The alternative option they considered was creating a single Central 
Asian Federation, without single republic entities. However, the leaders were fearful that this 
would foster pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic movements, who could potentially rise up in opposition 
against the Russian center.114 As a result of their collective fear, the Soviets instituted the Policy 
of National Delimitation in 1924, which established administrative borders for the Soviet 
Socialist Republics of Central Asia.115 While today we know Central Asia to encompass 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the Soviet officials 
differentiated between Kazakhstan and the other four Soviet republics, “referring only to the 
latter as Central Asia.”116  Although only minimal effort was made in designing the republics to 
follow natural geographic divisions, Moscow did take painstaking care to create heterogeneous 
states by mixing populations from the five main ethnic divisions: Turk, Tajik, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, 
and Kazakh. The goal was to avoid ending up with ethnically consolidated states that might fuel 
separatist or anti-Moscow sentiment.117  Their political goal “left large portions of one titular 
ethnic group of one state in the territory of another,”118 but because of the centralized nature of 
Soviet planning, the borders were not tangible prison walls keeping the ethnic populations 
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trapped inside. The borders existed only on maps. People and goods were free to move 
uninterrupted across borders, as all “economic and transportation links were designed to cross 
state lines”119 without restrictions. The 1924 policy, even with its many implications, was 
designed to serve the center; to function solely for Moscow’s needs.  
Before Stalin’s “great division,” Central Asia had never associated territory with a 
specific ethnic or linguistic group.120 It was instead a multi-ethnic land that was home to a 
similar culture. While Central Asia has been influenced by many different cultures throughout its 
history, it has been cultivated most by the Turco-Persian beliefs, languages, religions and 
principles. However across the vast steppes of the region, gradual shifts could be seen “from one 
dialect to another, from blue ceramics to azure, from one musical mode to a variant mode in a 
slower tempo.”121 Instead of ethnic or political divides between peoples, there were religious and 
cultural differences. For example, Muslim civilizations were more common around the Syr 
Darya River Basin and in the historic cities of Samarkand and Bukhara; whereas the Persian 
influence was weaker in the Tien Shan Mountains because the Turkic-speaking tribes had not 
been exposed to Islamic culture until the 18th and 19th centuries. Most importantly, these cultural 
differences did not equate to exclusion or conflict. In fact, in the period leading up to Soviet 
border delimitation, the region was split into three emirates: Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva; each 
one made up of a multi-ethnic population.122 The emirates were generally bilingual and the 
competition for power came not from different ethnic groups but from the many heterogeneous 
dynasties, clans and tribes. 
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According to Olivier Roy, ethnic terminology (e.g. Tajik, Turkmen, etc.) was used at the 
time, but only to describe shared characteristics of a group or people; it did not carry the political 
gravitas that it does today. The modern day concept of “ethnic group” was coined by 
industrialized, imperialistic states like the Soviet Union that needed to “justify an imposed 
territorial realignment,”123 like the 1924 delimitation policy. Since identities had been built 
largely around tribal or dynasty fidelities until 1924, ethnic pride or ‘nationalism’ were non-
existent when the individual republics were formed. Therefore, the Soviet political divides had 
little impact on the multi-ethnic peoples of Central Asia at first.  
When the USSR dissolved in 1991, the administrative borders arbitrarily created by the 
Soviets, suddenly took on major significance. All of the transboundary economic and 
transportation links were disrupted, and in effect, the republics stopped receiving subsidized 
energy supplies (this was more detrimental for the upstream, fossil-fuel deprived republics of 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan than for the others). Water, land, natural gas, oil deposits – all of 
which were once centralized and communal resources were now individually controlled; hence 
upon independence, certain states saw significant improvement in their strategic positions and 
increased asset capital, whereas others saw their economies and leverage in the region 
plummet.124 Ethnic groups who had been spread across the republics as a result of the 
delimitation policy could no longer cross the borders with ease to visit those they had been 
separated from; as many of the countries have imposed strict border controls and visa regimes.125 
The isolated ethnic populations became frustrated with this situation and sought someone to 
blame. The weak governments of these newly independent states used this frustration to build 
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popular unity and nationalism amongst the people in an effort to strengthen their own power. 
Often this meant depicting a neighboring state as the enemy. Ultimately, as “interaction between 
populations that once shared many aspects of a common culture and way of life”126 became less 
frequent and the nation building process was initiated, divisions and stereotypes were being 
formed in peoples’ minds, inevitably creating separations between certain groups.127 Today, the 
combination of an incomplete nation building process and a geographic “ethnic kaleidoscope” 
has already resulted in intrastate, communal violence (Note: In 1992 a five year civil war broke 
out in Tajikistan between the Moscow-backed government and the Islamic-led United Tajik 
Opposition; an estimated 50,000 people were killed)128 due to “cross national loyalties,” and may 
eventually lead to interstate violence between the different ethnic factions.129  
Implications of the 1924 National Delimitation Policy: 
As mentioned earlier, the 1924 borders were created as a part of Moscow’s administrative 
goals. Moscow did not think that clear delineation of these boundaries was necessary as all of the 
republics belonged to the larger entity of the Soviet Union.130 Although the borders held much 
less significance than they do today, boundary disputes related to ethnic identification were 
commonplace amongst the leaders of the republics who felt that they had claim on the territory 
of others. Moscow, serving as arbiter in these disputes, provided two common solutions, where 
applicable, to ease tensions: the redrawing of boundary lines, and the creation of enclaves. 
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Ironically, the chief difficulties facing the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia today seem to 
stem directly from these two Soviet-era solutions.  
The Redrawing of Boundary Lines: 
When the Soviet Union dissolved, a few major agreements were made between the newly 
independent states, such as the Minsk Agreement, Almaty Declaration and the CIS Charter; all of 
them called for successor states to preserve the status quo.131 Thus, the five Central Asian states 
jointly recognized the Soviet administrative borders as the new state boundaries. According to 
Timur Dadabaev, this was both “politically viable and economically rational,” because “border 
demarcation, fortification and due enforcement would have incurred additional costs and would 
have placed added political pressure on the leadership of these states to resolve issues of 
disagreements over borders.”132  
Nonetheless, given that the borders were essentially only general outlines, in conjunction 
with the fact that many different maps existed with varying border delineations due to the 
redrawing of lines, disputes inevitably ensued. The different state capitals began offering 
competing maps – whatever one was most favorable to their own claims – as the one “most true 
and accurate.”133 Since the archives were located in the Uzbek capital of Tashkent, the state had 
the “upper hand in the map wars.”134 Even so, Uzbekistan continues to be party to more than half 
of the region’s border disputes, and has long been perceived as the most aggressive of the 
regional states.   
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A current border dispute stemming from the redrawing of boundary lines during the 
Soviet era is between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and involves Turkmenistan’s historical 
claims to the Uzbek regions of Khiva and Khorezm. The argument of the Turkmen nationalists is 
that Khiva was one of the most important Turkic Khanates during the 1800s and that the majority 
of the regions’ inhabitants are of Turkmen descent. Uzbek nationalists respond that the regions 
of Tashauz and Turkmenabad in Turkmenistan are comprised of majority Uzbek populations, so 
based on Turkmenistan’s rationale, Uzbekistan has rightful claim to this territory.  
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are also mutually suspicious of one another as a result of 
historical claims to each other’s territory. Samarkand and Bukhara, two of Central Asia’s most 
important and historic cities, were included within Uzbek territory when the borders were drawn 
in 1924. As ethnic Tajiks constitute the majority of the respective populations (Note: While 
official estimates say 1.25 million ethnic Tajiks reside in Samarkand, Bukhara and surrounding 
areas, it is thought that as many as 7 million actually live there and that Soviet authorities 
registered Tajiks as Uzbeks when the internal borders were created), Tajikistan has long laid 
claim to these cities.135 Though Tajikistan is the poorest of the five states and therefore does not 
pose a military threat to the regional hegemon, the leaders of Uzbekistan do worry that 
determined Tajik terrorist cells might have the capabilities to inflict significant harm on its 
territory.136 
There are also historical grievances between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan that are ever-
present in the two countries today. When the 1924 border delimitations placed important parts of 
the Ferghana Valley, like the city of Osh, in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan felt it had been 
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unfairly deprived of its territory.137 Since 1991, the predominantly ethnic Uzbek population of 
Osh has harbored resentment towards Kyrgyzstan for its blatant attempt to ‘Kyrgyzcise’ the 
country, denying them fair representation in the process. In 2010, what can be described as an 
ethnic war (as the number of battle-related deaths was over 1,000) broke out between the 
minority and the majority group. Witnesses to the killings say that the attacks by the Kyrgyz 
population on the Uzbek minority in Osh and other southern Kyrgyzstan villages were attempted 
genocide. According to The Guardian, the official statements reporting 178 fatalities and 1,800 
casualties are “woeful underestimate(s),” whereas in reality, around 2,000 Uzbeks were 
massacred in the pogroms.138 
In addition to the boundary disputes described above, the Kazaks also make claims to the 
Uzbek capital of Tashkent and Uzbekistan makes claims on territory not only within 
Turkmenistan, but also within Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Seeing as there are hundreds of border 
disputes between the five CA states and this thesis cannot cover all of them, it is important to 
note that the core issues in dispute (i.e. where border lines should be drawn and what type of 
border regimes should exist) seem to be the same in all.139  
Enclaves: 
Another source of historical grievance, and the most controversial of the border issues in 
Central Asia today, was the creation of enclaves, or pockets of one country’s territory entirely 
surrounded, like an island, by another country’s territory. Enclaves were a result of the national 
delimitation policy which left several areas of one republic within the territory of another. The 
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physical position and status of enclaves did not become critical and contentious issues until after 
the collapse of the USSR.140 The most complicated disputes are over enclaves located within the 
Ferghana Valley. The complexity of these disputes is compounded by the fact that the countries 
which share the Valley – Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan – all have historical claims to 
each other’s territory, and subsequently, all have interests in the others’ industries, transportation 
routes, arable land, and most importantly for this thesis, the others’ river resources.141 The Sokh 
Enclave within Kyrgyzstan is most illustrative as it involves Uzbekistan, which has the most 
enclaves within the territories of others, it is one of the larger enclaves, it has been the locus of 
water disputes, and there has been recent ethnic conflict there.  
Before the Soviet Union was founded in 1922 the Ferghana Valley was “the political and 
cultural center of Islam,” ruled over by the Khan of Kokand (Note: Kokand is located in present 
day Uzbekistan). The valley’s religious heritage intimidated Moscow and motivated the Soviet 
planners to divide the lands into what are now its convoluted and incongruous borders.142 In 
addition to array of historic territorial claims to this land, the valley is also the primary food and 
water source for the region. Consequently, it has become one of the most densely populated and 
agriculturally rich areas in Central Asia, with 20 percent of the entire Central Asian population 
living on five percent of the territory (Note: Almost the entire Uzbek minority living in 
Kyrgyzstan resides in the Ferghana Valley).143 However, the valley is experiencing a shortage of 
water and a higher frequency of natural disasters (e.g. floods, droughts, etc.), due at least in part 
to a significant increase in air surface temperatures. The result is the domestic securitization of 
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and increased international competition for the region’s “dwindling natural resources.”144 The 
valley’s susceptibility to conflict increased even more in the early 2000s when it became host to 
the recruitment and activities of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) militant group.  
There are seven enclaves in the Ferghana Valley; four belonging to Uzbekistan that are 
entrenched within the territory of Kyrgyzstan. One of the largest is Sokh, which has been in 
contention since the 1920s and has received the most attention in recent years. Since Sokh has 
almost no ethnic Uzbeks (its ethnic composition is 99 percent Tajik) Kyrgyzstan has long 
challenged Uzbekistan’s claim over the enclave. However, a main concern of Uzbek officials is 
that it could become a safe haven for militant groups, like the IMU. Thus, Tashkent has long 
been pushing for an acreage trade: an Uzbek land corridor to Sokh (so it would not have to travel 
through Kyrgyz border controls in order to access and monitor the enclave) in exchange for 
another a strip of Uzbek land; however Kyrgyzstan has not agreed. In 2000, after the IMU gained 
access to the enclave, Uzbekistan unilaterally increased its role in securing the borders (laying 
mines along the boundaries seemed to be its preferred method), saying that Kyrgyzstan was not 
doing so effectively. But like in Shakhimardan, another Uzbek enclave in Kyrgyzstan where a 
general failure to demarcate and manage the border has caused many issues between the two 
countries, the boundary of the Sokh enclave is only delineated by a small stretch of barbed wire 
fence. So by unilaterally laying mines along what is an undefined border, Uzbeks were 
essentially expanding their territory.  
As the downstream riparian in both of the region’s major river basins, Uzbekistan’s 
second concern in Sokh, as in all its other enclaves is having control over the water resources. In 
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Sokh those resources come from the Sokh River, which runs through the enclave. However, the 
Soviet hydro-infrastructure (water pipes, irrigation systems, canals, etc.) was created to function 
as a centralized system, and since the 1924 border delineations did not consider the repercussions 
of placing an international border between a water pump station and the land it is supposed to 
irrigate (paradoxical situations this is are apparently quite common), regional conflict over these 
resources, particularly in essentially non-delimited enclaves like Sokh, has become ubiquitous.  
In January 2013, Sokh made international headlines when an estimated 40 Kyrgyz 
nationals were taken hostage by Sokh residents, after an alleged fight between residents and 
Kyrgyz border guards broke out the day before. In order to contain the unrest, Uzbekistan 
unilaterally closed the border crossing, essentially halting all travel and trade. The residents of 
Sokh lacked access to basic supplies and aid, until February when talks between officials led to 
the reopening of the border.145   
In addition to the enclave at Sokh, there are six others in the Ferghana Valley. Sarvan is 
the Tajik enclave within Uzbekistan; its principal economic activity is cotton farming. Vorukh 
and Western Qalacha are Tajik enclaves within Kyrgyzstan. Vorukh has a total population of 
between 23,000 and 29,000; 95 percent are ethnic Tajiks. Disputes over land and water led to 
open ethnic tension between the Tajiks and the minority Kyrgyz population in 1989, 1993 and 
1999. Western Qalacha covers less than one square kilometer of land in Uzbekistan and is 
located near the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. Barak is the Kyrgyz enclave within Uzbekistan.146 
According to Jumagulov Sultan from the Kyrgyz department of the BBC, in order to reach 
Barak, one must pass through a four kilometer stretch of Uzbek territory. “After 250 meters, 
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travelers are ‘hospitably’ met by the Uzbek armed frontier guard.” If they make it pass that point, 
then they must attempt to navigate the virtually impassable roads.147  There are three Uzbek 
enclaves within Kyrgyzstan besides Sokh. Shakhimardan lies at the intersection of the Ak-Su and 
Kara-Su rivers; the resources from which provide irrigation for the enclave’s agricultural 
economy. Unlike the demography in Sokh, the ethnic composition at Shakhimardan is 91 percent 
Uzbek and nine percent Kyrgyz.148 Both Qalacha and Dzhangail cover less than one square 
kilometer of Kyrgyz land. It is said that Qalacha has no inhabitants. When disputes over 
Ferghana Valley enclaves emerge, they are complex and often intractable because the three 
countries that share the valley all have historical claims on each other’s territory, stemming from 
the 1924 delimitation policy. In addition, they all have interests in the others’ industries, 
transportation routes, arable land, and water resources.  
When Soviet leaders instituted the 1924 National Delimitation Policy, they most likely 
did not anticipate that the resulting border disputes would remain until today, serving as the root 
cause of conflict in all other trigger conflicts. Their casual demarcation and enforcement of the 
borders, and the consequent need to resolve disputes by redrawing boundaries lines and creating 
enclaves has given rise to a festering instability in the region. As a result, an initially trivial 
trigger conflict has the potential to become an escalatory “turning point,” where the “issues begin 
to broaden, and victimized groups begin to link the triggering incident to more fundamental 
grievances.”149 
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Part 3 – Considering the Case Study from the Alternative Theoretical Perspective: 
 The aim throughout this thesis has been to predict if the current disputes over shared 
transboundary river basin resources in Central Asia will result in war or cooperation. I 
hypothesized that it would not be the specific water resource variable alone that would determine 
the dependent variable; instead it would be the overlay of conflict triggers, specifically those 
over shared water resources, upon historical root causes of conflict that would cause an outbreak 
of war. This hypothesis was informed by the Water War and Water Cooperation literature, as 
well as the literature on Violent Conflict. The latter states that trigger incidents rooted in 
fundamental grievances often become escalatory turning points in a conflict; thus in these 
situations war is more likely than cooperation.150 Relying on this theoretical proposition, I 
predict that interstate war is more likely than regional cooperation in Central Asia as the 
immediate trigger conflicts surrounding shared water resources are clearly rooted in fundamental 
grievances over the Soviet Union’s 1924 National Delimitation Policy.  
 Although the findings from this partial conflict analysis are consistent with my hypothesis 
that war is more likely than cooperation in Central Asia due to the coexistence of trigger 
conflicts and historical grievances, it is important to consider the alternative outcome; in this 
case cooperation, as both Case Study Research scholars Alexander George and Robert Lin, 
recommend.  
 Water Cooperation theorists deny any causality between access to water resources and 
international war. To briefly reiterate, their first argument is the historic one; that no interstate 
war has ever been fought over water, thus it is improbable that the first one in history will be in 
Central Asia. However, since the end of the Great Famine and the Black Death in 1350, the 
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global population has experienced continuous growth; meaning that the earth has never been as 
densely populated as it is today. As population correlates to water consumption, the strain on our 
freshwater resources is also at an all-time high. When severe scarcity of a critical, non-
substitutable, and communal resource like freshwater is experienced or anticipated by one or 
more states; and/or when such a resource is “perceived as being overexploited by other states at a 
cost to one’s own,” states become prone to conflict.151 With the crisis over freshwater resources 
becoming more critical each year, the historic argument, that no interstate war has ever been 
fought over water in the past so future wars are therefore unlikely, has little weight in a world 
that is drying up fast.  
 The second argument for the alternative outcome of cooperation is that water-treaties have 
historically proven to be resilient and effective, even in the face of conflict over other issues. In 
Central Asia, this has yet to be the case. After the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, the 
water ministers of the five Central Asian states agreed to maintain the Soviet era water allocation 
amounts; an accord they formalized in the 1992 Almaty Agreement on Joint Management of 
Water Resources.152 The Almaty Agreement led to the creation of the Interstate Commission for 
Water Coordination for Central Asia (ICWC). However, these regional agreements, as well as 
concurrent bilateral agreements for the release of water and exchange of electricity and fuel 
fuels, proved quite ineffective as it was both impossible to strictly monitor the quotas and 
manage the “ increasing power orientation of the Tokotgul operation,” which resulted in water 
storage levels reaching record lows.153 With help from USAID, the states contracted a new 
agreement in 1998, “which explicitly recognized that annual and multi-year irrigation water 
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storage has a cost and that it needs to be compensated through a barter exchange of electricity 
and fossil fuels or in cash.”154 Again, these agreements proved ineffectual, as the water storage 
amounts continued to reach low levels, “eroding the multi-year regulating ability of the 
reservoir.”155 According to the World Bank’s “Water Energy Nexus” report, even when the 
agreed upon summer discharge amounts were met, often not enough fossil fuels were supplied, 
forcing the upstream riparian countries to generate their own hydropower by releasing water in 
the winter months; in effect breaking the agreement. In addition, in years of heavy precipitation, 
the downstream countries did not require the full agreed upon amounts from the upstream 
riparians; this in turn “affected the export of electricity and the compensating quantities of fossil 
fuel transfers” to the upstream countries.156  
 The most noteworthy shortfall of all water-sharing agreements in Central Asia however, is 
the exclusion of Afghanistan. Ranking number six on Foreign Policy’s 2012 Failed States Index, 
until recently Afghanistan has been absent from all discussions concerning regional water 
sharing, despite the fact that it is the second largest contributor to the Amu Darya River after 
Tajikistan and more than a quarter of its population lives in the river basin. On its track to 
recovery, Afghanistan put together a “catalogue of possible confidence-building measures,” 
including the Istanbul Process Declaration which calls for cooperation on water management, but 
also for the development of hydroelectric power plants and large-scale irrigation 
infrastructure.157 While the country’s Amu Darya consumption is currently estimated between 
two and 25 percent (obtaining reliable data is another pervasive problem in this nation), these 
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mega-projects would increase the country’s consumption exponentially if implemented.158 It 
would be in the best interests of downstream Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to incorporate 
Afghanistan into water sharing agreements before these projects are implemented, because as the 
upstream country, Afghanistan does not have to fear water shortages like the others do. 
According to water specialists, scarcity per se, is not the problem in Central Asia; instead it is the 
issue of distribution. There is enough water for all of the countries if they share, but they have 
yet to come up with an effective and mutually beneficial agreement to govern their resources. 
Instead they find themselves in perpetual conflict. 
 Water Cooperation scholars argue next that interdependence is more likely than war 
because shared interests outweigh water’s conflict inducing characteristics. Though the five 
riparians in Central Asia would benefit from water cooperation, “they are increasingly prone to 
hanging separately, having failed to hang together.”159 Since independence and the dissolution of 
the centralized Soviet economic structures, the five states have all suffered “to one degree or 
another from hyperinflation, growth of unemployment, loss of traditional markets and trade 
outlets, and limited investment capital.” When cooperative efforts failed, the states pursued 
unilateral options that had the potential to resuscitate and stimulate their economies. As water is 
perceived as being essential not only for the survival of the region’s rapidly growing population 
but also for the five national economies, which depend on irrigated agriculture and/or 
hydropower, the states have started viewing it as a commodity instead of a common good. The 
potentially catastrophic combination of climate change, pollution and lack of resource 
management, and population explosion, has already caused the intrinsic value of water in the 
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region to soar, consequently transforming the resource into a matter of national security for each 
individual country. By securitizing water, the states have wasted the resource’s cooperation-
inducing potential and turned what could have been a cooperative, non-zero sum situation into a 
zero-sum hydropolitical conflict. Thus in Central Asia, cooperation is limited; and instead there 
are winners and losers.  
 The fourth argument for why the Central Asian states are more likely to cooperate is 
because war is expensive; water is therefore not worth fighting over. But when has war ever been 
cost efficient? According to the Costs of War Project carried out by a team of 30 economists, 
anthropologists, political scientists, legal experts, and physicians, the US federal price tag for the 
Iraq war (including an estimate for veterans’ medical and disability costs into the future) is about 
$2.2 trillion dollars.160 This cost does not take into account human lives, hundreds of thousands 
of which were lost, or the ripple effects on the US economy.161 Based on the argument made by 
Water Cooperation scholars, the US must have had a reason greater than the survival of its 
populace and its economy to go to war in Iraq. 
 While the prerequisites for interstate war are plentiful in Central Asia (e.g. concentrated 
resources, ethnically heterogeneous populations, competing historical claims to territory, non-
delineated and disputed borders disconnected from natural geographic and ethnic borders162) it 
seems possible, if not highly likely, that a war might break out, not because of cost-efficiency, 
but because some states in the region are weakening. The regional trend of increased domestic 
disorder (more specifically, a reduction in state building capacity, increased gaps between elites 
and populace, systemic poverty, a loss of faith in the government and free market economy, 
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radicalization of political opposition)163 as a result of ubiquitous corruption, terrorism, drug 
trafficking, organized crime, and systemic economic deterioration, may cause leaders to wage 
pre-emptive wars against one another, in hope of gaining control of important regional assets and 
stimulating their economies. War may also be “a means of overcoming internal strife and dissent 
by building popular unity against a common enemy.”164 Uzbekistan, coming in at number 39 on 
Foreign Policy’s “2012 Failed States Index” (Note: To put this into perspective, Rwanda ranks 
number 35 and Libya 50)165 and at number seven on Transparency International’s “2012 
Corruption Percentage Index,” (Note: Somalia ranks number one and North Korea number 
two)166 is also the strongest military actor in the region, making it the most probable candidate 
for this ‘war-in-a-last-ditch-effort’ situation.167 In addition, Karimov is not known for his rational 
thinking or even temper. Karimov assumed power in 1991 in the first of many questionable 
elections, and for twenty two years now has kept the population oppressed and indigent “under 
the loose tenants of communism.”168 The UN has accused his regime of using systematic torture 
and a former British ambassador to Uzbekistan said Karimov boiled dissidents to death.169 In 
May 2005, in what has today come to be known as the Andijan Massacre, Karimov’s 
government used lethal force against a group of unarmed people that were participating in a 
public protest. The organization Reporters Without Borders called Karimov a “Predator of Press 
                                                          
163 Olga Oliker and Thomas S. Szayna, Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: 
Implications for the U.S. Army (CA: RAND Publishing, 2003), 92. 
164 Ibid., 29. 
165 “Failed States Index,” Foreign Policy, last modified April 12, 2011, 
www.foreignpolicy.com/failed_states_index_2012_interactive. 
166 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2012,” Transparency International, last modified 2012, 
www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results. 
167 Olga Oliker and Thomas S. Szayna, 100. 
168 Ben Makuch, “Is Central Asia on the Verge of a Water War?” VICE Magazine, October, 2011, 
http://www.vice.com/read/is-central-asia-on-the-verge-of-a-water-war-.   
169 Joshua Norman, “The World’s Enduring Dictators: Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan,” CBS News, May 31, 
2011, www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20067420-503543.html. 
67 
 
Freedom," saying he "is still breaking his own records for repression and paranoia."170 In terms 
of his behavior with regional neighbors, Karimov frequently cuts vital gas deliveries to 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and places mines on their shared borders. In 1999 he attempted to 
eliminate terrorists in Tajikistan using air force strikes, and in 2011 he allegedly directed the 
deliberate sabotage of a railway bridge along the Uzbek-Afghan border. Karimov has also 
ordered the killing of border “interlopers,” the most recent being a Kyrgyz national in 2012. 
With labels such as “modern tribalism,” “cheap imitation Saddam” and “geopolitical 
wildcards,”171 commonly applied to Karimov and his regime, it is reasonable to conclude that a 
strict cost-benefit analysis would not be the determining factor in whether or not Uzbekistan goes 
to war.  
 The final and most easily refutable argument put forward by Water Cooperation scholars 
is that finding a feasible site for a water war is difficult, and therefore water peace is the more 
likely outcome. Their criteria for a water war is a downstream riparian that is highly dependent 
on river water and militarily strong in comparison to its upstream neighbors. It almost seems too 
easy. They do not even require a sultanistic regime; but we can throw that in for fun. 
 
CONCLUSION: 
 In Central Asia, disputes over Amu Darya and Syr Darya river basin resources have 
resulted in neither active war nor effective cooperation. Although the conflict in Osh can be 
described as an ethnic war based on the number of casualties, that represented one isolated 
incident and is not an accurate representation of the general level of conflict in the region. 
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Rather, the actors remain in a perpetual stage of ‘Intractable Conflict,’ characterized by tension 
and suspicion amongst the leaders, inflammatory rhetoric depicting neighboring states as the 
enemy, and isolated incidents of small-scale violence. All five Central Asian states, led by 
authoritarian and oppressive regimes, are already experiencing economic turmoil and internal 
strife. The addition of concurrent conflict triggers, the most common being the seasonality of 
water release, and historical grievances over the 1924 National Delimitation Policy, increase the 
likelihood of conflict escalation. I recommend third parties conduct a full conflict analysis to 
identify how escalation can best be prevented. Once third parties have a holistic assessment of 
the region, I recommend early intervention. According to the literature on conflict prevention, 
“early and robust” third party intervention is key in preventing violent conflict.172 If the trigger 
and historical conflicts are not addressed soon, the positions of the parties will harden and the 
disputes will intensify, pushing the actors into the next stage of ‘Active War.’ However, in an 
early intervention effort, third parties must address both the current conflict triggers as well as 
the historical grievances if they want durable peace. The reason for this is that if the current 
conflict triggers over water are resolved peaceably but the underlying historical grievances 
remain, then new trigger conflicts will continue to emerge, each one with escalatory potential, 
and ultimately Central Asia may become host to the first water war in history.  
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